The March 11 earthquake and tsunami broke down the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and a wide range of areas has been contaminated with radioactive substances. Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the evacuation zone was set to the area within a 20 km radius from FDNPP. People who lived in the zone were forced to evacuate on March 12. Fukushima Prefectural Disaster Headquarters (FPDH) planned to let them return to their home temporally and asked help to the Japanese governmental Nuclear Disaster Headquarters (JGDH), which then asked help to relevant organizations and agencies to attend the temporal returning program. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) was one of them and delivered a notice to all national, public, and private universities and colleges to dispatch a total of 30 volunteers a day for radioactive contamination screening of temporal returnees. This program started in May 10, 2011, but was conducted most actively in June and July, and continued intermittently in August and early September. Shujitsu University formed two volunteer teams each of which consisted of two faculty members. SS and TE belonged to theˆrst team which worked from July 13 to 18, 2011, and the second team consisting of HM and HA worked from July 21 to 25, 2011. This article was compiled to record our voluntary activity that constituted some aspects of the large scale radioactivity screening program planned by FPDH and JGDH.
A GM counter (model TGS-146B, Hitachi Aroka Medical, Ltd.) was used to detect radioactivity of returnees. This counter expresses radioactivity as counts per minute (cpm). EŠective doses were measured by an ion chamber scintillation counter (model ICS-321, Hitachi Aroka Medical, Ltd). EŠective doses are expressed as microsieverts per h ( mSv/h). When radioactivity (cpm) and eŠective doses ( mSv/h) on the ground were measured with TGS-146B without a b-ray shield and ICS-321 at nine places in Iitate-Village, Fukushima on July 17, 2011, the mean cpm/mSv/h±SD was 504.6 ±102.1 (n＝9). Roughly speaking, 1 mSv/h corresponds to 500 cpm. Radioactivity in the outdoor of Shujitsu University was 74 cpm, i.e., 0.148 mSv/h. One year consists of 8,760 h. Therefore, the radioactivity is calculated to be 1.30 mSv/year, which is roughly close to the background level in Okayama-City, 1.44 mSv/year (http://www.geosociety.jp/hazard/content0058.html). Conversion form cpm to mSv and vice versa, however, is principally invalid, because cpm re‰ects the number of decomposition and mSv re‰ects absorbed energy. Therefore, the equation 500 cpm＝1 mSv is only a conventional indicator to get rough idea about numerals appeared on the GM counter and the ion chamber scintillation counter. Protection wares such as Tyvek suits, gloves, shoe-covers, masks, and caps were all provided by FPDH and JGDH.
Nuclides can be identiˆed by their speciˆc energy spectra. Contamination in Fukushima areas is mainly caused by three nuclides I-131, Cs-134, and -137. For example, contamination (Bq/kg wet soil in parentheses) in Namie Town, Fukushima on March 17, 2011, was I-131 (30,000), Cs-134 (2,300), Cs-137 (2,300), Sr-89 (1.3), and Sr-90 (3.3) (http://www.jaea.go.jp/ fukushima/pdf/setsumei.pdf). Others including a-emitters were negligible, if any. Therefore, radiation detectors used here counted mostly b-and g-rays emitted from I-131, Cs-134, Cs-137, and contribution of Sr-89 and Sr-90 was negligible. Even though detectors used here cannot detect a-rays, a-emitters are nothing to do with the present report.
One of the authors, SS, saw a copy of the written request from JGDH to MEXT on May 13, 2011, and learnt the temporal returning program. When SS talked about the program at the monthly faculty meeting of May, four people including SS showed interest in it. Recruiting of volunteers for the June activity was made on May 20, but we could not adjust our schedule to it. Volunteers for the July activity was announced on June 20, and we applied to it byˆlling in the format on June 22. MEXT asked us to attend the July activities as we proposed on June 24; SS and TE were assigned to from July 13 to 18, and HM and HA, from July 21 to 25, 2011.
On July 13 (Wed), we arrived at the Fukushima Station in the afternoon and lodged in a hotel near the station. The hotel had been damaged by the earthquake and was under repair. It was just re-opened to guests from early July. We reserved a rental car. Radioactivity around the hotel was arbitrarily measured. Radioactivity in my hotel room, on the road just in front of the hotel, and on the ground in the Cycle Park near the hotel was 60, 3,500, and 3,650 cpm, respectively. We attended the explanatory meeting held in a room of the Fukushima Prefectural O‹ce from 7:00 p.m. Of four oŠ-site centers for the temporal returning program, Bajikoen (horse training center), the Kodo Gymnasium, the Kawauchi Gymnasium, and the Hirono Central Gymnasium, we were assigned to Bajikoen, which is located in Minamisoma-City, 68 km east to FukushimaCity, Fukushima-Prefecture, for four days (Fig. 1) .
On July 14 (Thu), we left the hotel at 8:00 a.m. and arrived at Bajikoen at around 10:00 a.m. Several persons concerned made addresses and explanations to temporal returnees. A TEPCO person apologized for their giving tremendous troubles to the refugees, and around 20 TEPCO people bowed deeply and synchronously. After explanations, the returnees put on a cap, a mask, a Tyvek suit, shoe-covers, and gloves ( Fig.  2A) .
They left Bajikoen on buses for their homes at around 10:30 a.m. Then, the duties and procedures of the screening were explained for participants. The number of academic volunteers was not large. Many participants seemed to be dispatched from electric companies and energy-associated organizations or agencies on duty. There were experienced people and they contributed to conduct the screening smoothly. When we measured radioactivity on the surface of asphalt pavement outside the Bajikoen building, it was 6500 cpm.
The layout of the Bajikoen OŠ-site Center is shown in Fig. 3 . Returnees were allowed to stay in their homes for 2 h and take goods that could be contained in a plastic bag. They started to arrive at around 1:30 p.m.; their bus stopped at the entrance (Fig. 3A ). An escort, who carried the bag, led each returnee to the reception (Fig.  3B) , where he or she received the inquiry sheet that had beenˆlled before departure. Returnees were distributed to one of six screening booths ( Fig. 3C1-C6 ), to which the escort delivered his or her goods. Five people worked at a booth; one removed the shoe-covers, two examined the radioactivity of the goods, and two monitored the body for contamination (Fig. 2B) . After the survey, one monitor put a check in the inquiry sheet as no problem. If more than 13,000 cpm were detected, goods or persons had to be subjected to decontamination treatments (Fig. 3H, I ). These cases were not found. Returnees were escorted to one ofˆve undressing booths (Fig. 3F) . Five people at a booth helped undress them. They moved to the recording table (Fig.  3G) , where the identiˆcation card and a cumulative dosimeter hung from their neck were removed, and the date, name and a total eŠective dose was recorded. SS 
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Fukushima Disaster and Radioactivity Screening worked at the recording table for a short period. Most cumulative dosimeters showed 2 to 4 mSv, and no one exceeded 10 mSv. They took their belongings at the cloakroom ( Fig. 3K) and, followed by an escort with goods, left Bajikoen for their not homes but for refuges (Fig. 3M) .
Hot days lasted and the ambient temperature marked around 369 C. The Bajikoen OŠ-site Center was not airconditioned. People in charge of screening were fully equipped like returnees (Fig. 2B) . Six people were assigned to a booth, whereˆve worked and one took a rest at 10 min intervals. A couple of returnees fell by heatstroke and took to a hospital by an ambulance. We put our names and a‹liations on our Tyvek suit, otherwise returnees might take us as TEPCO employees and show hostility. When they learned that we were from universities, they sometimes expressed their thanks.
A total number of returnees was 258 and 16 busses took them to their homes. Each bus was accompanied by a leader, two attendants, and two radiation monitors. As a result, a total of 338 people was monitored by we 36 examiners. Our duty was over at 3:30 p.m. Many old'' areas. Immediately before screening, the leader (star mark) declared that the hot line became eŠective. People who tried to cross the hot line from the hot area to the cold area had to be screened each time. Two sub-leaders and several medical doctors were at service. A shows a bus stop close to the entrance with six bus-escorts. B shows a reception table where two staŠ served returnees, who received a document that had beenˆlled out before departure. They were then directed to their screening booth number. There were 15 in-escorts who carried each returnee's baggage and escorted them from the bus to the reception to the screening booth. At C1-C6 were six screening booths, at each one of which six people were engaged in screening jobs. D shows relaying tables from screening to undressing. Six out-escorts were working in between the screening tables and relaying tables. They carried baggage and escorted returnees. E shows a resting area for volunteers who took a rest in turn. F1-F6 denote undressing tables. Five people were working at each table. G is a recording table where eŠective doses measured using a dosimeter that had been hanging around a returnee's neck were recorded. H and I are decontamination areas served by Self-Defense Forces. Other symbols show the following: J, TEPCO Survey Center; K, cloak area; L,ˆrst-aid; M, entrance and exit; and N, a press corner.
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other participants were working at Bajikoen; the number probably reached more than 120.
On July 15 (Fri), a total number of returnees was 264 and 16 busses took them to their homes. A total of 344 people was monitored. Our duty was over at around 3:30 p.m.
Returnees favored weekends. On July 16 (Sat), a total number of returnees was 451 and 24 busses were used. They were divided into two. A total of 571 people was monitored. Monitoring of the second half wasˆnished after 5:00 p.m.
On July 17 (Sun), a total number of returnees was 464 and 24 busses were used. They were divided into two. A total of 584 people was monitored. Monitoring wasˆn-ished after 5:00 p.m. Thus a total of 1,837 people was monitored during four days.
During oŠ-duty periods, we measured radioactivity at various places. It was odd to see that there were neither rice plants nor farmers in riceˆelds, which were covered with various kinds of weeds instead. In some local communities along the way form the OŠ-site Center to our hotel, people were evacuated and no lights came from dark rooms of the houses in the evening. When we drove to the seaside of Kashima-Ward, Minamisoma-City, tetrapods at the seawall were ‰own deep into lands, and manyˆshing vessels carried by the tsunami were overlapped beside roads several km deep in the land. At Kitaizumi, Hara-Ward, MinamisomaCity, a whole community had been swept away by the tsunami and a barren grass land remained as if there was nothing from the start.
Activities of the Team 2 (HM and HA, July 21 to 25) were carried out as follows. There was a preliminary meeting in the evening on July 21. HM and HA were assigned to the Kawauchi Gymnasium on July 22 and 23, and to the Hirono Central Gymnasium on July 24. The layouts of the oŠ-site centers diŠered from that of Bajikoen (Fig. 3) depending on the structures of the buildings, screening procedures were almost the same to those for the team 1. Owing to the typhoon No. 6 (Ma-on), maximum ambient temperatures were 209 C on July 22 and 23, and 269 C on July 24; working conditions were not so bad as those of the team 1. Screening was conducted by people dispatched from nuclear power plants of electric companies, Shujitsu University, Ehime University, Oita University, and Tsukuba University. One ofˆve booths was assigned to academic people.
In the morning on July 22, relevant persons from the district headquarters, a medical care team of MEXT, and the local police o‹ce informed returnees of instructions and cautions. Then, TEPCO people made an apology, to which returnees listen calmly and, seemingly, desperately. On this day, 411 returnees from 251 families lived in Tomioka-Town and 309 returnees from 179 families lived in Minamisoma-City were screened. Both the Kawauchi Gymnasium and the Hirono Central Gymnasium were used to returnees from TomiokaTown.
On July 23, 405 returnees from 241 families lived in Tomioka-Town, 203 returnees from 117 families lived in Naraha-Town, and 272 returnees from 158 families lived in Minamisoma-City were monitored. Returnees from Tomioka-Town were divided into two and both the Kawauchi Gymnasium and the Hirono Central Gymnasium centers were used for screening. No one from Tomioka-Town, south to Okuma-Town where FDNPP is located, was exposed to cumulative doses over 10 mSv on July 22 or 23.
On July 24, 323 returnees from 200 families lived in Okuma-Town, 447 returnees from 258 families lived in Namie-Town, and 202 returnees from 113 families lived in Futaba-Town were monitored. Returnees from Okuma-Town were divided into two and the Hirono Central Gymnasium and the other oŠ-site centers were used for screening. Dosimeters of returnees from Okuma-Town showed cumulative doses of 8-36 mSv, suggesting that contamination levels aŠected directly exposure doses. The exposure dose of one X-ray photography of the chest is approximately 50-100 mSv, and exposed doses to returnees were relatively small to induce any health eŠects. Our voluntary activities were just the tip of an iceberg. The FDNPP disaster is part of the tragedy caused by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. Soon after the tragedy, oŠ-site centers were set up and many volunteers have been recruited by MEXT. Table 1 shows a tentative data of volunteer activities, including radioactivity screening of returnees, screening of evacuees in refuges, medical care of workers in FDNPP, and contact and adjustment between organizations associated with radiation protection. Many employees of electric companies and associated organizations were working on duty. Taking into consideration that academic people were assigned to one or two screening booths ofˆve or six, much more people than the number listed in Table 1 must engaged in the temporal returning program. Table 2 shows tentative data of people treated within the four oŠ-site centers.
People (78,000) lived in the evacuation zone were forced to leave their homes and less than half (33,600; 43z) could go home and stay there for only 2 h (Table  2) . They were allowed to fetch a bagful of goods. Fortunately, no one was contaminated heavily over 13,000 cpm. Most returnees whom we asked the situation of their homes answered that their gardens were full of high weeds. A man replied that his house was fallen down by the earthquake and its aftershocks; he is a victim of both the tremor and radiation. Those who did not return home may include lots of double-punched people like him. Voluntary work of radioactivity screening was well organized and conducted smoothly, letting us feel that we Japanese could do things cooperatively and e‹ciently, once proper targets are bestowed.
FPDH reports the results of radioactivity screening conducted at permanently installed and circular stations from March 13, 2011 to the present. It is presently conducted at seven permanently installed stations (http:// wwwcms.pref.fukushima.jp/pcp _ portal/PortalServlet; jsessionid＝C34F7700BB5FDA83373C60A3F059F1C6?
By October 10, 2012, people of 259,108 had been screened, of whom 102 people were found to be contaminated with radioactivity to a level greater than 100,000 cpm. These heavily contaminated people were found only during the screening period from March 13 to 31, 2011. They were subjected to whole-body decontamination treatment. FPDH says that the level of 100,000 cpm was determined to be acceptable based on opinions presented by two academic radiology specialists sent to FPDH by MEXT and by researchers of the National Institute of Radiological Sciences. Handling of contamination levels by the Fukushima Medical University was also referred to. Granted that 500 cpm are equal to 1 mSv/h, 100,000 cpm is 200 mSv/h (0.2 mSv/h). Because the exact exposure time is unknown, accurate radiation doses cannot be estimated. They would have been exposed to 4.8 mSv, a radiation dose close to the X-ray examination of the stomach, 3.4 mSv (1), if they had not been decontaminated for a day or 24 h. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) employs the linear non-threshold (LNT) model and estimates the lifetime risk is 5z per 1 Sv, i.e., when 100 people are exposed to 1 Sv, 5 persons would die of solid cancers excessively (2) . Given that they were exposed to 4.8 mSv (0.0048 Sv), 24 persons out of 100,000 people (0.024 persons/100) would die of cancer excessively, if deaths are proportional to exposed doses according to the LNT model. Taking into consideration the fact that one third of Japanese people die of cancers, this value is small. Moreover, probably in fear of overestimation, ICRP advocates that it is inappropriate to use the LNT model to predict the cancer risk of a large population exposed to low dose radiation. Therefore, the lifetime risk of 0.024 persons/100 may be an overestimate, and 100,000 cpm is apparently acceptable for a limited exposure time. Fortunately, FPDH reports that no hazardous eŠects have been detected among those people.
FPDH also stipulated that those who were contaminated with radioactivity of a level greater than 13,000 cpm and less than 100,000 cpm were subjected to partial decontamination treatment. We volunteers were also told to take contaminated people with more than 13,000 cpm to the decontamination sector (Figs. 3H, 3I) . How was the 13,000 cpm determined? A relevant law rules that the upper limit of radioactivity should be 4 Bq/cm 2 for those with a particle emitters and 40 Bq/cm 2 for those without a particles. For a particle emitters, the limit is 4×60 cpm/cm 2 (240 cpm/cm 2 ). Usually, 100 cm 2 are measured, implying 24,000 cpm/100 cm 2 . Because the counting e‹ciency is less than half at most, 12,000 cpm would mean actual counts of more than 24,000 dpm. A margin of 1,000 cpm might be added to 12,000 cpm to give 13,000 cpm. Later, results showed that a particle emitters were not included in the contaminants of the Fukushima area, the upper limit becomes 40 Bq/cm 2 or 240,000 dpm/100 cm 2 . The counting e‹ciency was less than 50z, leading to 120,000 cpm/100 cm 2 . The count might be rounded to simpliˆed 100,000 cpm as a guide value.
In between March 13 and 31, 2011, 102 people were heavily contaminated. When were they contaminated? U.S. DOE (the Department of Energy of the U.S.A.) and NISA (the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Government of Japan) reported that the greatest distribution of contamination occurred on March 19. Contamination patterns on March 23 and April 29 were almost identical (http://energy.gov/situation-japan-updated-102111). The U.S. DOE and NISA reports also suggest that during theˆrst 10 days or so, 1) large-scale emissions of radioactive substances had ceased, and 2) contaminated areas were determined in a week or two, most probably until March 23. An east wind from March 11-14 carried large quantities of the radioactive substances over the Paciˆc. A west wind on March 15 blew back toward populated areas (3) . Meteorological analyses concluded that the radioactive material transported by rain or snow from 5:00 p.m., March 15, to 4:00 a.m., March 16, was the major contributor to contamination in Fukushima-Prefecture, whereas rains at 8:00 a.m., March 21, and 6:00 a.m., March 23, were the major sources in Ibaraki-, Tochigi-, Saitama-, and ChibaPrefectures and in Tokyo-Metropolis (4). Indeed, when we dropped in Usuishi Elementary School in IitateVillage to measure radioactivity in the school ground and upper aerial zone, teachers of the school told us that they had snowfall of about 10 cm deep on March 15 (5). Taken together, most of 102 people must get wet by rain or snow on March 15 or 16, and be contaminated. Very fortunately, no one had adverse eŠects so far by the contamination as FPDH reported.
Radioactivity in food and drink has been restricted strictly to the present. Internal radiation is negligibly minimal as inferred from data of the many Fukushima people who have been examined with whole body counters. Therefore, external radiation is the present issue. It comes from radioactive cesium. Cs-137 emits b-rays, 94.4z of which penetrate 1.62 mm into water and 5.6z of which penetrate 5.04 mm into water. Cs-137 also emits g-rays (6). Cs-134 emits b-rays which penetrate 1.21 mm into water. Most b-rays can be protected by the skin, which is one of the radiation-resistant tissues in the body and contributes to guard internal organs. Contamination inside houses or buildings is minimal. Decontamination of land is underway. Considered comprehensively, the eŠects of radioactive contamination on people in Fukushima and other contaminated areas are apparently minimal. Figure 4 depicts the decay of radioactivity in Fukushima-City. Except for early days or a couple of months when I-131 was dominant, radioactivity most of which are emitted from Cs-134 and Cs-137 seems to be decaying according to the equation: P(t)＝2/3.7×P(0)2 -t/30 ＋2.7/3.7×P(0)2 -t/2
, where P(t) is a total ionizing dose at time t, t is time (years), and P(0) is the original dose.
